Fire in the Hole

Constantin Meunier, Return from the Mine, Wikimedia Commons

Fire in the Hole

By ‘Gas Bill’

Perhaps the greatest threat to life in the British coal mining industry was gas explosions. The total casualty figure attributed to this source between 1837 and 1927 was 3,500. Following loss of life in such an incident, the usual approach was investigation via a coroner’s inquest; perhaps not the most effective means of discovering what had gone wrong. Usually the verdict was the rather vague one of ‘accidental death’. The primary cause was hardly ever looked into. Evidence given at inquests might do little more than speculate about an insecure safety lamp, or a failure to ensure airways were kept clear.  Explosions tended to be caused by a release of methane, known in the trade as fire damp. As if this wasn’t bad enough there could also be carbon monoxide, otherwise called choke, or after damp. In short, if the explosion didn’t kill you, then there was another gas which could cause suffocation.

A curious feature of the South Wales coalfield was that prior to 1845 it had remained largely free of explosions. After this date things changed drastically. By 1849 there had been 52 deaths from explosions. The number of fatalities at individual collieries also rose significantly. In 1852, at Middle Duffryn Colliery, eight miners were killed. This was a modest total at a single colliery compared with what was to follow. In 1856 at Cymmer Rhondda 114 men and boys were killed. The number of explosions recorded in the collieries of South Wales between 1845 and 1852 was 183, causing a total of 291 deaths. Between 1851 and 1869 matters grew worse; 18 explosions took a total of 815 lives, including 120 deaths in a single incident at Black Vein Colliery, Risca, in 1860. With some understatement collieries prone to explosions were described as working ‘fiery’ coal seams.

Ironically there had been significant improvements in safety during this period, notably in the fields of ventilation, inspection and the widespread adoption of safety lamps. Prior to 1845 miners had been using naked flames for illumination without adverse effect, even though coal mined in these collieries could continue to emit gas in the holds of ships up to two weeks after it was loaded.

The man who took an interest in this situation was Thomas Joseph (1819-1890). He was born in Merthyr Tydfil and left school at fourteen to work with his father, a colliery manager. Despite his education being curtailed at such an early age Joseph acquired exceptional mathematical skills. He was even trusted by Isambard Kingdom Brunel, no less; the great engineer used him to carry out preliminary surveys for the Vale of Neath Railway.

In May 1871,  Joseph read a paper to the South Wales Institute of Engineers on the subject of gas explosions. It is a curious mixture of Victorian callousness, reflecting prevailing attitudes and a careful examination of the problem. In his paper, Joseph was dismissive of the notion that additional inspections as supported by ‘trades union leaders from the working class’ could be of assistance. He doubted that this would increase safety to any degree predicting that ‘their frequent officious interference in the details of the mine, presuming as ignorant men would do upon their official position’.

Having dismissed the competence of those who actually risked their lives in digging the coal Joseph went on to state his case, pointing out that the principles he was putting forward are ‘stated with some boldness but are based on lifelong experience and have been used in the winning and development of 5000 acres of fiery coal in the Welsh valleys’. He added that during his 35 years managing collieries only six lives were lost through explosions, a remarkably small figure considering the carnage occurring elsewhere in the district.

Joseph went on to speculate that despite the increases in safety there had been no improvement in the situation and therefore, ‘some violation of physical laws must be at work here’. Evidently colliery owners had convinced themselves that improvements in ventilation were the only defence available in preventing explosions, despite the casualty figures suggesting otherwise.

Joseph noted that one of the standard terms in mining leases was that lessees were required to leave barriers or walls in every seam, usually at least twenty yards in thickness and intended as a safeguard against inundation by water from other collieries. He conceded that a colliery owner had every incentive to promote safety and noted that the loss of a human life ‘can lead to a monetary loss of up to £200 which has the potential to drive an owner into bankruptcy’. Unfortunately he failed to elaborate on this figure but went on to add that much of the ‘teaching, writing and legislation has only dealt with secondary causes and symptoms of danger and with their results as if it were a hopeless task to think of grappling with and mastering the evil at its source’.

Ventilation in collieries was still in a rather primitive state. Some engineers favoured powered ventilation, others open furnaces. Joseph felt that the differences in types of ventilation weren’t significant. He recalled entering collieries in his youth which contained a maze of workings and old roadways ‘where the air was so foul that it was next to impossible to carry a light and yet no explosions occurred’. He described conditions for miners in these collieries as being like working inside a gasometer.

Joseph went on to state that by strict adherence to certain principles collieries ‘may be placed in a state of absolute safety’. The danger he felt was caused by walled in gas; old workings and unworked overlying seams. It all depended, he felt, on working seams in the right order of succession. Joseph recommended beginning with the upper seams of coal and also to avoid working the seams inclining upwards first. There was an obvious practical reason for mining first on the rise side as it was called, since the coal would be moved more easily down to the shaft, before being raised to the surface. Joseph looked at the reports of HM Mines Inspectorate and noted that since 1851 all explosions had occurred in the rise or uphill workings. He advised against exploiting lower seams first since this caused sudden squeezes or creeps which travelled up the plane of the strata. Leaving an unworked seam lying over a ‘favourite’ seam of coal caused a sudden increase in pressure and a flood of firedamp. Once the gas was set free, ‘it can only be compared to the breaking of a great reservoir driven under huge pressure’.

Joseph concluded his address with several recommendations. These principles he said may be applied in absolute safety. Shafts sunk near the summit of coal seams would keep barriers of unworked coal to a minimum. He recommended that every upper seam be worked first and warned that beginning with rise workings would lead to blowers of gas from the roof or floor of the mine, noting that sudden squeezes or creeps invariably travel up the plane of the strata, never down. He also suggested a new role for the mines inspectorate: that of approving future exploitation of coal reserves.

Admittedly, Joseph would have been unaware at that time of the effect of coal dust. It was known that dust exacerbated the effects of explosions. Only later was it learnt that coal dust on its own was capable of spontaneously exploding. Even so, why weren’t his methods tried beyond the area in which he was working? Perhaps the philosopher David Hume had the answer when he referred to ‘avarice, the spur of industry’.

The mining industry in South Wales expanded hugely during the second half of the nineteenth as the demand for steam coal rose. Welsh collieries were the main source for this type of coal and clearly the mine owners wanted the most economically valuable seams to be exploited first. Usually mining on the rise side was the quickest way to achieve this. In short, human life was secondary to profit and the maintenance of good safety standards. Long after Joseph’s death the casualties continued, the most notable being at Senghenydd Colliery near Caerphilly in 1913. Here a gas explosion killed 439 miners. As Luke 4:24 puts it: ‘truly I tell you no prophet is accepted in his hometown’.

William Hartley is a Social Historian